

1. INTRODUCTION

16 Before the Court are motions brought by three different
17 groups of defendants, each asking that the Court either dismiss
18 this action without prejudice, or stay the action and compel all
19 of the plaintiffs to participate in various forms of alternative
20 dispute resolution, which defendants argue the plaintiffs are
21 contractually obligated to do. The plaintiffs, for their part,
22 argue that they did not agree to participate in the alternative
23 dispute resolution, that the contractual provisions purportedly
24 requiring them to participate are unconscionable and
25 unenforceable, and that certain of their claims are not viable for
26 alternative dispute resolution and should proceed before the Court
27 regardless.

Having reviewed the voluminous briefs submitted by the

1 parties,¹ as well as the supporting declarations and documentary
2 evidence, the Court hereby DENIES all of the defendants' motions.
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4 **II. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND AND PENDING MOTIONS**

5 Plaintiffs Jeff Pokorny ("Pokorny") and Larry Blenn ("Blenn,"
6 collectively with Pokorny, "Plaintiffs") brought this suit against
7 Quixtar, Inc. ("Quixtar") and a number of its affiliates, alleging
8 that Quixtar operates an illegal pyramid scheme in violation of
9 the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. §
10 1961 et seq. ("RICO"), and the California Business and Professions
11 Code § 17200, et seq. See Compl., Docket No. 1.

12 **A. Original Motions**

13 The Court previously took the following motions under
14 submission:

15 Quixtar moved the Court to dismiss or stay the litigation and
16 to compel Plaintiffs to comply with a dispute resolution
17 agreement. See Docket No. 28 ("Quixtar Mot."). Plaintiffs
18 opposed this motion and Quixtar replied. See Docket Nos. 59
19 ("Opp'n to Quixtar Mot."), 71 ("Quixtar Reply").
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21 ¹Despite each party having had the opportunity to submit in
22 excess of 40 pages of briefing to support its argument, the parties
23 still found need to violate the Civil Local Rules governing the
font size and spacing of text in their briefs, including footnotes.
The Court will not endeavor to list each violation here.

24 For the reasons discussed herein, this litigation will proceed
before the Court rather than before an arbitrator or other neutral.
Counsel should review the Civil Local Rules before proceeding. The
25 first noteworthy item counsel will find in reviewing those rules is
that they are not, in fact, called the "Civil Local Guidelines."
26 If the parties fail to abide by the Civil Local Rules in future
submissions, the Court will strike the non-compliant portion of any
27 brief.

1 Defendants Britt Worldwide, L.L.C. ("Britt Worldwide"),
2 American Multimedia, Inc., Britt Management Inc. ("Britt
3 Management"), Bill Britt, and Peggy Britt (collectively the "Britt
4 Defendants"), joined the Quixtar Motion and also moved the Court
5 to dismiss the litigation and compel compliance with the dispute
6 resolution agreement. See Docket No. 32 ("Britt Mot.").
7 Plaintiffs opposed this motion, and the Britt Defendants replied.
8 See Docket Nos. 60 ("Opp'n to Britt Mot."), 70 ("Britt Reply").

9 Defendants James Ron Puryear, Jr., Georgia Lee Puryear, and
10 World Wide Group L.L.C. ("World Wide", collectively the "Puryear
11 Defendants")² joined the Quixtar Motion and the Britt Motion and
12 also moved the Court to dismiss or stay the litigation and compel
13 compliance with the dispute resolution agreement. See Docket No.
14 36 ("Puryear Mot."). Plaintiffs opposed this motion and the
15 Puryear Defendants replied. See Docket Nos. 61 ("Opp'n to Puryear
16 Mot."), 69 ("Puryear Reply").

17 In support of their Opposition briefs, the Plaintiffs
18 submitted declarations from Stephen Hayford and Robert
19 Fitzpatrick, two purported experts. See Docket Nos. 65, 66.
20 Quixtar objected to and moved to strike these declarations. After
21 extensive briefing on that question, including Plaintiffs
22 requesting leave to file a sur-reply and Quixtar opposing that
23 request, the Court ultimately granted Quixtar's motion and struck
24 the two declarations. See Docket No. 90.

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26 ²Quixtar, the Britt Defendants, and the Puryear Defendants are
27 collectively referred to in this order as "Defendants." The Britt
Defendants and the Puryear Defendants are collectively referred to
as the "IBO Defendants."

1 **B. First Amended Complaint**

2 While the foregoing motions were pending, Plaintiff Kenneth
3 Busiere ("Busiere," collectively with Pokorny and Blenn,
4 "Plaintiffs") filed suit in the Los Angeles County Superior Court
5 against the same Defendants involved here, seeking injunctive
6 relief under California Business and Professions Code section
7 17200. See Docket No. 88. Defendants removed that suit to the
8 Central District of California and moved to dismiss. Judge Matz
9 in the Central District concluded that the Busiere action was
10 duplicative of the present matter and dismissed that case without
11 prejudice. See Docket No. 91 Exs. 1, 2.

12 After Judge Matz dismissed the Busiere action, Plaintiffs
13 sought leave to amend their Complaint here to add Busiere as a
14 plaintiff and to add claims for injunctive relief. See Docket No.
15 94. Before the Court ruled on the Motion for Leave, the parties
16 stipulated that Plaintiffs could amend the Complaint, that the
17 pending motions to dismiss or stay would be applicable to the
18 First Amended Complaint, and that the parties could submit
19 supplemental briefing solely to address the question of whether
20 the new claims for injunctive relief should be submitted to
21 arbitration. Docket No. 99. The Court approved the stipulation.
22 Docket No. 100. Thus, the operative pleading is now the First
23 Amended Complaint ("FAC"). Docket No 97.

24 Plaintiffs, Quixtar, and the Puryear Defendants all submitted
25 supplemental briefs. Docket Nos. 103 ("Pls.' Supp."), 101
26 ("Quixtar Supp."), 102 ("Puryear Supp."). Each then submitted a
27 reply to the first round of supplemental briefing. Docket Nos.
28

1 104 ("Pls.' Supp. Reply"), 105 ("Quixtar Supp. Reply"), 107
2 ("Puryear Supp. Reply").

3 **C. Changes in Governing Law**

4 Pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7-3(d), the parties have also
5 brought to the Court's attention a number of purportedly relevant
6 judicial decisions issued following the close of briefing on the
7 pending motions. See Docket Nos. 86 (Davis v. O'Melveny & Myers,
8 485 F.3d 1066 (9th Cir. 2007)), 93 (Shroyer v. New Cingular
9 Wireless Servs., Inc., 498 F.3d 976 (9th cir. 2007)), 113
10 (Morrison v. Amway Corp., No. 06-20138, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 2693,
11 (5th Cir. Feb. 6, 2008) ("Morrison II")), 111 (McCrone v. Amway
12 Corp., No. 07-2737 (N.D. Ohio Feb. 21, 2008) (as amended, Mar. 3,
13 2008)). The parties dispute whether or not Morrison II is
14 relevant and whether or not it was appropriate for Plaintiffs to
15 notify the Court of that decision. See Docket Nos. 109, 110, 112.
16 Plaintiffs moved the Court to strike Quixtar's last submission on
17 this issue, relating to a petition for rehearing of the Fifth
18 Circuit's decision. Docket No. 113. Quixtar then informed the
19 Court that the petition for rehearing had been denied, apparently
20 rendering moot the motion to strike. Docket No. 114.
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22 **III. FACTUAL BACKGROUND**

23 **A. Parties**

24 Quixtar is a multi-level marketing program that sells a
25 variety of products and services through a network of individual
26 distributors known as Independent Business Owners ("IBOs"). See
27 Quixtar Mot. at 2; VanderVen Decl. Ex. 1. In addition to selling
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1 Quixtar products, IBOs can earn bonuses by recruiting new
2 distributors into their "line of sponsorship." See FAC ¶ 2;
3 VanderVen Decl. Ex. 2 at B-2. In order to help the businesses
4 they sponsor (i.e., the new IBOs they have recruited), IBOs may
5 sell Business Support Materials ("BSMs"), also known as "tools"
6 and "functions". See Quixtar Mot. at 3; VanderVen Decl. Ex 2 at
7 C-4. These may include motivational books and recordings, as well
8 as conferences and seminars, all intended to help the IBO sell
9 more Quixtar products. See VanderVen Decl. Ex 2 at C-4.

10 Bill and Peggy Britt are Quixtar IBOs, members of Britt
11 Worldwide, and owners of American Multimedia, Inc., and Britt
12 Management. See Britt Decl. ¶¶ 1-3.

13 James and Georgia Puryear are Quixtar IBOs and members of
14 World Wide. Davis Decl. ¶ 3. World Wide offers convention and
15 event planning, organizational assistance, tax assistance, and
16 other forms of support to IBOs. Id. ¶ 4. Since January 2005,
17 World Wide has also sold BSMs to certain qualified IBOs. Id. ¶ 5.

18 Plaintiffs allege that they are IBOs "downline" from the
19 Puryears in the same line of sponsorship, and the Puryears are
20 downline from the Britts. See FAC ¶¶ 4-15.

21 **B. Applicable Agreements**

22 Defendants assert that Plaintiffs entered into numerous
23 agreements incorporating the arbitration provisions at issue here.

24 Upon joining Quixtar, all IBOs are required to execute the
25 Quixtar-Affiliated IBO Registration ("Registration"). See FAC ¶
26 20, Ex. 1; VanderVen Decl. ¶ 4. The Registration includes the
27 "Agreement to Arbitrate" and incorporates the Dispute Resolution
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1 Procedures found in the Quixtar Rules of Conduct ("RoC"). See FAC
2 ¶¶ 20, 22, Ex. 1; VanderVen Decl. Ex. 2 at D-39.

3 In 1997, 1998, and 1999, Pokorny signed forms that included
4 the arbitration provision and incorporated the RoC when he renewed
5 his Registration. See VanderVen Decl. Exs. 6-8. Quixtar claims
6 that Pokorny renewed his agreement to these terms when he
7 automatically renewed his Registration in subsequent years.
8 Quixtar Mot. at 4-5. Pokorny disputes that the auto-renewals
9 amount to his agreement to those terms. Pls.' Quixtar Opp'n at 6.
10 However, Pokorny does not appear to argue that he did not agree to
11 the arbitration provision, or that, to the extent that provision
12 is enforceable, his relationship with Quixtar is not governed by
13 it.

14 Unlike Pokorny, Blenn claims he never signed the Registration
15 form, was never made aware of the RoC, and never agreed to
16 arbitrate his claims. See Blenn Decl. ¶ 2. Blenn's wife Lorraine
17 completed the Registration in 2004. VanderVen Decl. Ex. 12.
18 Blenn and his wife subsequently signed a Quixtar Business Name
19 Change Form, which added Blenn to his wife's business and changed
20 the name of the business to Blenn Enterprises. Id. Ex. 14. The
21 Business Name Change Form does not reference arbitration or the
22 RoC. See id. The Blenns then apparently renewed their IBO
23 Registration. See Ex. 15.

24 In addition to the Registration, Quixtar asserts that both
25 Pokorny and Blenn agreed to arbitrate by entering the BSM
26 Arbitration Agreement ("BSMAA"). Quixtar Mot. at 5. Pokorny
27 signed the BSMAA himself. VanderVen Decl. Ex. 10. Blenn's wife
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1 signed it prior to Blenn completing the Business Name Change Form.
2 See id. Ex. 13.

3 Finally, Quixtar asserts that Plaintiffs agreed to arbitrate
4 their disputes when they joined the Dreambuilders Membership
5 ("DM"). Quixtar Mot. at 6. DM sells services and BSMs to IBOs
6 affiliated with World Wide. Davis Decl. ¶¶ 7, 8. To register
7 with DM, an IBO must visit the DM website and agree to the DM
8 Terms and Conditions. Id. ¶ 12(f). Pokorny registered with DM in
9 December 2004 and upgraded his membership in March 2005 and May
10 2006. Id. ¶ 9. Blenn registered with DM in December 2004 and
11 upgraded his membership in March 2005. Id. ¶ 10. The DM Terms
12 and Conditions in effect at the time Pokorny and Blenn joined DM
13 included a "Binding Arbitration" section, which required the
14 registrant to agree to submit to binding arbitration which would
15 be "conducted in accordance with the rules of the then in force
16 Quixtar Arbitration Rules set forth in the IBO Rules Of Conduct."
17 Id. Exs. 1, 2.

18 Other than the general allegations that he is a Quixtar IBO
19 and that all IBOs were required to execute the Registration, the
20 parties do not provide any information about specific agreements
21 applicable to Busiere. Busiere did not join the other Plaintiffs'
22 claims for damages, and asserts that the claims he did join for
23 injunctive relief are not subject to the arbitration provisions
24 regardless of whether those provisions are enforceable.

25 **C. The Quixtar Dispute Resolution Process**

26 All of the foregoing agreements ultimately incorporate the
27 Quixtar dispute resolution process Plaintiffs challenge here. The
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1 multi-stage process is outlined in section 11 of the RoC. See
2 VanderVen Decl. Ex. 2 at D-39 to D-53.

3 The first stage in a dispute between IBOs or between an IBO
4 and Quixtar is Informal Conciliation:

5 In most cases, concerns or disputes about
6 apparent or alleged violations of the [RoC]
7 will first be handled informally, as described
8 above, once questions about the proper
9 interpretation of the [RoC] have been
10 clarified. IBOs with serious or persistent
11 disputes that have not been previously
12 resolved should contact the Business Conduct
13 and Rules Department. That department,
14 individually or with the assistance of the
15 Hearing Panel Chairperson, will attempt to
16 resolve an IBO's concerns in conjunction with
17 the affected IBO and the assistance of upline
18 leadership.

19 Id. at D-40. "Hearing Panel" refers to the Independent Business
20 Owners' Association International ("IBOAI") Hearing Panel. Id.
21 According to Quixtar, the IBOAI is "the voice of the IBO" and
22 "provides an open channel of communication with [Quixtar] on all
23 aspects of the business, taking an active role in shaping its
24 future." Id. at C-4. An IBO may join the IBOAI for a small
25 annual fee, and IBOs that reach the "Platinum" level of business
26 become voting members of the IBOAI. Id. Quixtar equates the
27 Informal Conciliation to a "standard commercial mediation."
28 Quixtar Mot. at 4-5.

29 If Informal Conciliation is not successful, the IBO may
30 present its claim to the Hearing Panel in Formal Conciliation.
31 VanderVen Decl. Ex. 2 at D-40 to D-42. At the Formal Conciliation
32 hearing, the IBO may argue its case to a three-member panel of
33 IBOAI board members, using documentary evidence and individual
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1 testimony as it sees fit. Id. at D-41. The panel's goal is to
2 "mediate or conciliate each dispute by determining the facts and
3 recommending to [Quixtar] any possible resolutions or remedy in
4 accordance with the [RoC]." Id. Following the hearing, the panel
5 issues a written recommendation for resolution of the dispute.
6 See id. The full board of the IBOAI may, at its discretion,
7 review the panel's recommendation, and may consider additional
8 written argument and evidence from the parties. Id. Finally,
9 Quixtar itself will review the recommendation of the panel (or the
10 full board, if applicable) and the complete case file, conduct any
11 additional investigation it deems necessary, and will issue a
12 final decision accepting, reversing, or modifying the panel's
13 recommendation. Id.

14 If an IBO fails to resolve its dispute through either of the
15 above procedures, it must submit its claim to binding arbitration
16 as follows:

17 In the event that the parties are unable to
18 resolve their disputes within 90 days or after
19 the above outlined Conciliation Process is
20 complete, whichever is later, the parties are
21 required to submit any remaining claim(s)
22 arising out of their IB, the IBO Plan, or the
23 Rules of Conduct (including any claim against
24 another IBO, or any such IBO's officers,
25 directors, agents, or employees or against
26 [Quixtar] or any of its officers, directors,
27 agents, or employees) to binding arbitration
in accordance with the Arbitration Rules as
stated below. The Arbitration award shall be
final and binding and judgment thereon may be
entered by any court of competent
jurisdiction. Demand for arbitration shall be
made within two years after the issue has
arisen, but in no event after the date when
the initiation of legal proceedings would have
been barred by the applicable statute of
limitations. IBOs acknowledge that their

1 application or ITC form evidences a
2 transaction involving interstate commerce.
3 The United States Arbitration Act shall govern
4 the interpretation, enforcement, and
proceedings pursuant to the arbitration
proceedings.

5 Id. at D-42. This is substantially the same text that appears
6 under the heading "AGREEMENT TO ARBITRATE" on the Registration.
7 See FAC Ex. 1. Following this provision of the RoC, there are an
8 additional eleven pages of rules governing an arbitration
9 proceeding initiated by an IBO. See VanderVen Decl. Ex. 2 at D-42
10 to D-53. The relevant provisions of those rules are discussed
11 below in the context of unconscionability.

12 Defendants, by their various motions, assert that Plaintiffs
13 are bound to follow the procedures described above rather than
14 litigate in this Court. See Quixtar Mot.; Britt Mot.; Puryear
15 Mot. Plaintiffs argue that the arbitration agreement is
16 procedurally and substantively unconscionable, and therefore,
17 unenforceable. See FAC ¶¶ 20-28.

18

19 **IV. CHOICE OF LAW**

20 Plaintiffs argue that California law governs whether the ADR
21 provisions are unconscionable. See Opp'n to Quixtar Mot. at 6-7.
22 Quixtar argues that Michigan law governs the question. See
23 Quixtar Reply at 2-3. The Court finds that California law governs
24 the question whether the ADR Provisions are unconscionable.

25 Section 2 of the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 1 et
26 seq. ("FAA"), provides that arbitration agreements "shall be
27 valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds that

1 exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract." 9
2 U.S.C. § 2. Thus, "[i]n determining the validity of an agreement
3 to arbitrate, federal courts 'should apply ordinary state-law
4 principles that govern the formation of contracts.'" Ferguson v.
5 Countrywide Credit Indus., Inc., 298 F.3d 778, 782 (9th Cir. 2002)
6 (quoting First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938,
7 944 (1995)).

8 In determining which state-law principles apply, a district
9 court applies the choice-of-law rules of its forum state. See
10 Paracor Fin., Inc. v. Gen. Elec., 96 F.3d 1151, 1164 (9th Cir.
11 1996). Under California law, the choice-of-law analysis depends
12 on whether the parties have a choice-of-law provision in their
13 contract. See ABF Capital Corp. v. Grove Props. Co., 126 Cal.
14 App. 4th 204, 216 (Ct. App. 2005).

15 Quixtar rests its claim that Michigan law applies on RoC
16 11.5.21, which states:

17 Unless otherwise specified in the parties'
18 contract, the law of Michigan shall apply in
19 all arbitrations under these rules. The
20 Arbitrator's decision on applicable law shall
be final and binding for purposes of the
arbitration and enforcement of any award.

21 VanderVen Decl. Ex. 2 at D-47. California law recognizes, subject
22 to limitations, contractual choice of law provisions which
23 designate the law to be applied regarding an agreement's
24 construction and enforceability. Nedlloyd Lines B.V. v. Super.
25 Ct., 3 Cal. 4th 459, 464-65 (1992). This recognition extends to
26 arbitration agreements. See Cronus Invs., Inc. v. Concierge
27 Servs., 35 Cal. 4th 376, 387 (2005).

1 The problem for Quixtar is that RoC 11.5.21 does not
2 designate which law is to be applied regarding the enforceability
3 or construction of the ADR Provisions, but rather mandates which
4 law "shall apply in all arbitrations" once they have been
5 initiated. VanderVen Decl., Ex. 2 at D-47 (emphasis added). The
6 courts, rather than arbitrators, "must decide whether the
7 arbitration provision is invalid and unenforceable under 9 U.S.C.
8 § 2 of the FAA." Naqampa v. Mailcoups, Inc., 469 F.3d 1257, 1264
9 (9th Cir. 2006). A provision which refers only to the law which
10 an arbitrator must apply when hearing a dispute does not determine
11 which "state-law principles" a court must apply when making the
12 determination whether the agreement giving the arbitrator that
13 power is enforceable. See Ferguson, 298 F.3d at 782.

14 Quixtar asserts that this reading of RoC 11.5.21 is too
15 narrow. The only support Quixtar offers for this position,
16 however, is a rhetorical question in a footnote. Quixtar Reply at
17 2 n.3 ("Why would the parties call for Michigan law governing only
18 the arbitration but allow the law of the 50 states to control
19 whether the agreement was in fact formed?"). Quixtar should have
20 considered this when it drafted the agreement, as examples of
21 broadly-drafted and enforceable choice-of-law clauses are readily
22 available. See, e.g., Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S.
23 462, 481 (1985). The Court will not read "all arbitrations under
24 these Rules" to mean "all disputes under this contract." The
25 Court's interpretation is supported by the fact that other
26 relevant agreements purporting to incorporate the Quixtar
27 Arbitration Agreement have their own choice-of-law provisions,

1 suggesting that RoC 11.5.21 is only applicable to arbitration
2 proceedings. For example, the DM Terms and Conditions, which
3 govern the relation between DM, an IBO, and its downline IBO
4 customers, is purportedly governed by the law of the state of
5 Washington, even though that same agreement requires that
6 arbitration be conducted in accordance with the RoC. See Davis
7 Decl. Ex. 1.

8 Because there is no governing choice-of-law provision, the
9 Court follows the "government interest analysis" used by
10 California courts. See ABF Capital, 126 Cal. app. 4th at 216
11 (citing Wash. Mut. Bank v. Super. Ct., 24 Cal. 4th 906, 919-20
12 (2001)). Under this test, the party advocating the application of
13 another state's law must demonstrate how application of that law
14 will further that state's interest. See Wash. Mut. Bank., 24 Cal.
15 4th at 920. For the court to follow another state's law, the
16 party advocating that law has the burden of showing three things:
17 (1) that there is a material difference between California law and
18 the other state's law; (2) if there is a material difference in
19 the law, that the foreign state has an interest in having its own
20 law applied, and that such interest conflicts with California's
21 interest in the application of California law; and (3) that the
22 other state's interests would be more impaired if the court does
23 not apply that state's law. See id. at 919-20. If the party
24 fails to show any of these factors (e.g., if the laws do not
25 materially differ, or if the laws differ but the foreign state
26 does not have a strong interest in application of its law in this
27 matter), the court must apply California law. See id.

1 Quixtar failed to satisfy this burden, or even to address
2 these factors in a meaningful way. Nonetheless, under the test
3 outlined above, it is clear that California law must apply.
4 First, there is a material difference between Michigan and
5 California law regarding unconscionability. While Michigan law
6 recognizes the availability of alternative goods, services, or
7 employment as a defense to procedural unconscionability,
8 California law does not. Compare Clark v. DaimlerChrysler Corp.,
9 706 N.W.2d 471, 475 (Mich. Ct. App. 2005), with Nagrampa, 469 F.3d
10 at 1283 (collecting California authority). Quixtar argues that if
11 Plaintiffs did not want to be bound by the arbitration agreement,
12 they could have signed up with a different company. See Quixtar
13 Reply at 4-5. This defense has been explicitly rejected in
14 California. See Nagrampa, 469 F.3d at 1283.³

15 Second, Quixtar fails to identify what interest Michigan has
16 in application of its law in this matter. Plaintiffs argue that
17 California has a strong interest in protecting its citizens. See
18 Opp'n to Quixtar Mot. at 7-8. Plaintiffs rely on Klussman v.
19 Cross Country Bank, 36 Cal. Rptr. 3d 728 (Ct. App. 2005).

21 ³Quixtar cites two cases in support of its position that
22 California considers the availability of alternatives. Quixtar
23 Reply at 5. Neither is applicable. In the first, Dean Witter
24 Reynolds, Inc. v. Superior Court, 211 Cal. App. 3d 758 (Ct. App.
25 1989), the plaintiff was an investor and attorney specializing in
26 class action litigation, which, in combination with the
27 availability of alternatives, the court found to diminish any
procedural unconscionability. See id. at 771-72; Naqampa, 469
F.3d at 1283 (distinguishing Dean Witter Reynolds). Quixtar also
relies on this Court's order compelling arbitration in Posern v.
Prudential Securities, Inc., No. C-03-0507 SC (N.D. Cal. May 3,
2004). Posern is irrelevant because it was applying New York's law
of unconscionability rather than California's. See id. at 17.

1 Klussman dealt with a contractual waiver of the right to bring
2 class action suits. Like Pokorny, Blenn, and Busiere, the
3 Klussman plaintiffs were California residents who executed the
4 contested contract in California, asserted claims under California
5 law, and sought to represent California citizens in a class. See
6 id. at 730-31; Compl. ¶¶ 2-4, 69-70. While the specific
7 unconscionable provision in Klussman was different, the court
8 there recognized California's interest in protecting plaintiffs
9 similar to Pokorny, Blenn, and Busiere. Given that none of the
10 Defendants asserts Michigan's interest, or describes how that
11 interest conflicts with California's interest in this matter, the
12 Court will apply California law.

13

14 **V. DISCUSSION**15 **A. The Arbitration Agreement Applies to Blenn**

16 Before considering the merits of the unconscionability
17 dispute, the Court must address the threshold question of whether
18 the various arbitration agreements apply to Blenn, or only to
19 Pokorny.⁴ Blenn claims that he never signed any of the agreements
20 at issue here, and is therefore not bound to arbitrate, even if
21 the Court finds the Quixtar dispute resolution process

22 ⁴Quixtar also suggests that participation in the Informal
23 Conciliation process is a condition precedent to initiating
24 arbitration or litigation, and that Plaintiffs' failure to engage
25 in that process is sufficient reason to dismiss the case without
addressing unconscionability. This begs the question. Plaintiffs
argue that the Informal Conciliation process is itself
unconscionable, and that they should not be required to participate
in it. As such, the Court considers that issue below, in the
context of substantive unconscionability, rather than as a
dispositive threshold question.

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1 enforceable. The Court disagrees. Blenn claims to be a Quixtar
2 distributor, and as Plaintiffs themselves allege, all Quixtar
3 distributors are required to execute the Registration. This is
4 part of the basis for Plaintiffs' challenge to the entire Quixtar
5 ADR scheme. See FAC ¶¶ 78-90. If Blenn were not a Quixtar
6 distributor, he would not be representative of (or even a member
7 of) the proposed class, and could not have suffered the alleged
8 injuries which give him standing. More to the point, Blenn's
9 relationship to the Defendants is through his business, Blenn
10 Enterprises. Blenn Enterprises, through Lorraine Blenn, executed
11 the Registration and the BSMAA. That it did so prior to Blenn's
12 becoming a part of Blenn Enterprises is immaterial.

13 **B. Legal Standard**

14 Under California law, the unconscionability of a contract
15 provision is a question of law to be decided by the Court. See,
16 e.g., Am. Software, Inc. v. Ali, 46 Cal. App. 4th 1386, 1391 (Ct.
17 App. 1996). A party asserting unconscionability must demonstrate
18 both procedural and substantive unconscionability at the time the
19 contract was made. See id. at 1390. "Substantive
20 unconscionability focuses on the actual terms of the agreement,
21 while procedural unconscionability focuses on the manner in which
22 the contract was negotiated and the circumstances of the parties."
23 Id. Although both procedural and substantive unconscionability
24 must be present, courts apply a sliding scale, such that the
25 greater the evidence of one form of unconscionability, the less
26 evidence of the other is necessary. See Davis, 485 F.3d at 1072-
27 73 (citing Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Servs., Inc., 24

1 Cal. 4th 83, 114 (2000)).

2 **C. Procedural Unconscionability**

3 Plaintiffs first argue that the arbitration agreement is
4 procedurally unconscionable because Quixtar presented it to them
5 on a "take it or leave it" basis without meaningful opportunity to
6 negotiate.⁵ Opp'n to Quixtar Mot. at 8-9; Pokorny Decl. ¶ 2.
7 Quixtar does not suggest that Plaintiffs negotiated the terms of
8 the agreement, or even could have done so, but rather that the
9 IBOAI negotiated the terms of the agreement on behalf of all IBOs,
10 including Plaintiffs. Quixtar Mot. at 16. Quixtar also argues
11 that there is no procedural unconscionability because Plaintiffs
12 signed the agreements and because Plaintiffs could have worked
13 with a company other than Quixtar. Quixtar Mot. at 16; Quixtar
14 Reply at 4.

15 As the latter two of Quixtar's arguments are easily disposed
16 of, the Court addresses those before delving into the negotiation
17 issue. First, the fact that Plaintiffs signed the agreements is
18 immaterial. Plaintiffs' argument is not that they did not enter
19 the agreements with Defendants, but that the agreements they
20 entered are unconscionable.⁶ That the Plaintiffs entered an

21 ⁵The parties dispute whether the IBOs are "sophisticated
22 business people" or inexperienced and unsophisticated. Neither has
23 produced evidence on this issue, and the Court finds it unnecessary
24 to resolve, given that it is clear Quixtar was in a superior
25 bargaining position to Plaintiffs and does not contest that
Plaintiffs themselves did not have a meaningful opportunity to
negotiate, apart from the IBOAI's participation.

26 ⁶The Court has already rejected Blenn's position that he did
27 not execute the Registration or other arbitration agreement. Thus,
the purported class of plaintiffs includes those who are Quixtar
distributors, and all distributors were required to execute the

1 agreement with Quixtar is the starting point of the discussion,
2 not the end of it. Were it otherwise, no party to a contract
3 would ever be able to argue unconscionability. Second, the Court
4 has already determined that the availability of alternatives does
5 not preclude a finding of procedural unconscionability under
6 California law. See supra Section IV; Shroyer, 498 F.3d at 985.
7 The sole remaining issue is the negotiation of the arbitration
8 agreements.

9 To determine whether a contract provision is procedurally
10 unconscionable, the Court looks for oppression or surprise, where
11 oppression "'arises from an inequality of bargaining power that
12 results in no real negotiation and absence of meaningful choice.'" Nagrampa, 469 F.3d at 1280 (quoting Flores v. Transamerica
13 HomeFirst, Inc., 93 Cal. App 4th 846, 853 (Ct. App. 2001)). The
14 focus of the inquiry is on the manner in which the contract was
15 presented and negotiated. Id. at 1282. "When the weaker party is
16 presented the clause and told to 'take it or leave it' without the
17 opportunity for meaningful negotiation, oppression, and therefore
18 procedural unconscionability, are present." Szetela v. Discover
19 Bank, 97 Cal. App. 4th 1094, 1100 (Ct. App. 2004).

21 Quixtar does not contest the fact that none of the Plaintiffs
22 negotiated the terms of the arbitration agreements. The
23 determinative question, then, is whether Plaintiffs' interests
24 were sufficiently represented by the IBOAI during those
25 negotiations. Quixtar's predecessor, Amway, had some form of
26

27 Registration.

1 conciliation procedure in its Rules of Conduct as early as 1994,
2 and added binding arbitration provisions in 1998, after
3 negotiation with the Board of the Amway Distributors Association
4 ("ADA"), the IBOAI's predecessor. See VanderVen Decl. ¶¶ 5-6.
5 The ADA and Amway notified all then-current Amway distributors of
6 the new provisions. Id. ¶ 7, Exs. 3, 4.

7 Participation in the IBOAI is open to all IBOs, but not
8 mandatory. See id. Ex. 2 at C-4. However, even among the IBOs
9 that join the IBOAI, voting rights are restricted to those who
10 have achieved the "Platinum" level. Id. Nothing in the record
11 gives any indication that Plaintiffs were even members of the
12 IBOAI. However, they never reached the Quixtar Platinum level, so
13 even if they were members of the IBOAI, they had no right to vote
14 for board members. See Davis Decl. ¶¶ 9-10. The record is also
15 devoid of any evidence regarding the formal relationship between
16 the IBOAI and its IBO members. This is particularly significant
17 given that Plaintiffs, as downline, or junior, IBOs, are not only
18 suing Quixtar but are also suing upline, or senior, IBOs.
19 Plaintiffs allege that certain upline IBOs, including the Britt
20 Defendants and the Puryear Defendants, are jointly participating
21 in an unlawful enterprise with Quixtar. In such a scenario,
22 allowing the most senior IBOs to "negotiate" the rights of all
23 other IBOs would be leaving the proverbial fox in charge of the
24 henhouse.

25 Without any factual allegations to support Defendants'
26 assertion that the IBOAI acted with Plaintiffs' interests in mind,
27 the record supports a conclusion of at least minimal procedural

1 unconscionability. Defendants concede that none of the Plaintiffs
2 had the opportunity to negotiate the terms of the arbitration
3 agreement. That alone supports a finding of procedural
4 unconscionability. See, e.g., Szetela, 97 Cal. App. 4th at 1100.
5 To overcome this conclusion, Quixtar would have had to present
6 evidence or legal authority that the IBOAI adequately represented
7 Plaintiffs' interests. Quixtar provided neither.

8 **D. Substantive Unconscionability**

9 Substantive unconscionability examines the fairness of the
10 actual provisions of the contract.

11 An arbitration provision is substantively
12 unconscionable if it is "'overly harsh'" or
13 generates "'one-sided' results." Armendariz,
14 24 Cal. 4th at 114 (quoting A & M Produce Co.
15 [v. FMC Corp.], 135 Cal. App. 3d [473, at]

16 486, 487 [(Ct. App. 1992)]). "[T]he paramount
17 consideration in assessing unconscionability is
18 mutuality." Abramson [v. Juniper Networks,
19 Inc.], 115 Cal. App. 4th [638,] 657 [(Ct. App.
20 2004)]. California law requires an
21 arbitration agreement to have a "modicum of
22 bilaterality," see Armendariz, 24 Cal. 4th at
23 117, and arbitration provisions that are
24 "unfairly one-sided" are substantively
unconscionable, see Little v. Auto Stiegler,
Inc., 29 Cal. 4th 1064, 1071 (2003).

20 Naqampa, 469 F.3d at 1280-81. Quixtar asserts that Plaintiffs'
21 case should be dismissed for failure to participate in Informal
22 Conciliation, as required by the RoC. Plaintiffs argue in
23 response that the entire Quixtar ADR process is substantively
24 unconscionable, and therefore not enforceable.

25 1. Pre-Arbitration Procedures

26 Quixtar spends a good portion of its Motion and Reply
27 briefing arguing that courts favor non-binding mediation and are

1 willing to enforce agreements requiring non-binding mediation as a
2 condition precedent to arbitration or litigation. See Mot. at 7-
3 12; Reply at 5-6. Despite the impressive list of cases Quixtar
4 cites, the effort is not well spent. Plaintiffs do not challenge
5 the general proposition that, where the parties enter a valid and
6 enforceable agreement to mediate or arbitrate, the Court should
7 require compliance. Rather, Plaintiffs argue that the Informal
8 and Formal Conciliation procedures set forth in the RoC are
9 substantively unconscionable, and therefore unenforceable. Opp'n
10 to Quixtar Mot. at 10-13. Quixtar cites more than a dozen cases
11 in support of its position that Courts are willing to enforce
12 agreements which require non-binding mediation, but none of those
13 cases required the court to rule on unconscionability, and only
14 one – Allen v. Apollo Group, Inc., No. H-04-3041, 2004 U.S. Dist.
15 LEXIS 26750 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 9, 2004) – even involved a challenge
16 to the validity of the agreement. The remainder of the cases
17 involve ancillary questions of contract interpretation, such as
18 whether the dispute in question fell within the parties' ADR
19 agreement, whether a party had in fact satisfied a condition
20 precedent to arbitration, or whether the FAA governs a particular
21 form of ADR.⁷ None of those questions is relevant here.

22
23 ⁷See Wolsey, Ltd. v. Foodmaker, Inc., 144 F.3d 1205 (9th Cir.
24 1998); DeValk Lincoln Mercury, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 811 F.2d 326
25 (7th Cir. 1987); HIM Portland, LLC v. DeVito Builders, Inc., 317
26 F.3d 41 (1st Cir. 2003); Kemiron Atl., Inc. v. Aquakem Int'l, Inc.,
27 290 F.3d 1287 (11th Cir. 2002); Bill Call Ford, Inc. v. Ford Motor
Co., 48 F.3d 201 (6th Cir. 1995); Ziarno v. Gardner Carton &
Douglas, LLP, No. 03-3880, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7030 (E.D. Pa.
Apr. 8, 2004); Mortimer v. First Mt. Vernon Indus. Loan Ass'n, No.
AMD 03-1051, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24698 (D. Md. May 19, 2003);
Fisher v. GE Med. Sys., 276 F. Supp. 2d 891 (M.D. Tenn. 2003);

1 Moreover, some of Quixtar's authorities are actually
2 unfavorable. Quixtar's general position is that participation in
3 Informal Conciliation is a condition precedent to arbitration or
4 litigation, and that the Court should therefore order Plaintiffs
5 to Informal Conciliation or to arbitration. In Kemiron Atlantic,
6 the parties had agreed to a multi-step dispute resolution process
7 that included mediation and arbitration. 290 F.3d at 1289. The
8 court ruled that despite the general policy favoring arbitration,
9 the FAA only gives the courts authority to order arbitration where
10 the parties have agreed to it. Id. at 1291. In that case,
11 because the parties had not mediated their dispute, they had not
12 done all of the necessary pre-arbitration steps, so the court held
13 it did not have the power to compel arbitration, and the case
14 proceeded in litigation. Id. In HIM Portland, the court followed
15 Kemiron and reached the same conclusion. 317 F.3d at 44 ("Where
16 contracting parties condition an arbitration agreement upon the
17 satisfaction of some condition precedent, the failure to satisfy
18 the specified condition will preclude the parties from compelling
19 arbitration and staying proceedings under the FAA.").⁸ By that

20
21 Ponce Roofing, Inc. v. Roumel Corp., 190 F. Supp. 2d 264 (D.P.R.
22 2002); Philadelphia Hous. Auth. v. Dore & Assocs. Contracting,
23 Inc., 111 F. Supp. 2d 633 (E.D. Pa. 2000); Preferred MSO of Am.-
Austin LLC v. QuadraMed Corp., 85 F. Supp. 2d 974, 979-80 (C.D. Cal.
1999); AMF Inc. v. Brunswick Corp., 621 F. Supp. 456 (S.D.N.Y.
1985).

24 ⁸Oddly, Quixtar quotes this exact passage in support of its
25 motion. However, the court in HIM Portland only held that the
26 condition precedent – mediation – must be satisfied before the
27 court could order arbitration. The appellate court affirmed the
district court's denial of a motion to compel arbitration, but did
not compel mediation, which is what Quixtar would have this Court
do.

1 reasoning, even if the Court were to find the arbitration
2 agreement here valid and enforceable, it could not grant Quixtar's
3 alternate request and compel arbitration.

4 Plaintiffs, however, advance a number of problems with the
5 Conciliation stages of the Quixtar process, and argue that the
6 agreement is not enforceable. The specific defects Plaintiffs
7 allege are:

- 8 1. The Hearing Panel must make recommendations that promote
9 the RoC being challenged here.
- 10 2. The Conciliation requirement is not mutual. IBOs must
11 bring claims against Quixtar using the Quixtar ADR
12 process, but Quixtar is not required to do so.
- 13 3. The Conciliation process is not neutral because the
14 IBOAI board is dominated by the "Kingpin" IBOs that
15 Plaintiffs allege are part of the same unlawful
16 enterprise as Quixtar.
- 17 4. At most, the Hearing Panel or IBOAI board can make a
18 recommendation, which Quixtar may accept, reject, or
19 modify at its discretion.
- 20 5. Quixtar may unilaterally modify the RoC.
- 21 6. The procedure is burdensome, time-consuming, and
22 designed to encourage compliance with the very rules
23 Plaintiffs are challenging here.
- 24 7. IBOs must initiate all arbitration proceedings within 2
25 years, even if the applicable statute of limitations is
26 longer.

27 Opp'n to Quixtar Mot. at 10. Based on these provisions,
28 Plaintiffs argue that the Conciliation process is unconscionable
and futile. *Id.* at 10-14.

29 Quixtar relies heavily on the Ninth Circuit decision in
30 Wolsey because that case required plaintiffs to go through a
31 multi-stage ADR process comparable to Quixtar's. See Quixtar
32 Reply at 5-6. The reliance is misplaced. In that case, the
33

1 parties' agreement had a choice-of-law provision which required
2 application of California law. Wolsey, 144 F.3d at 1209.
3 California's statutes governing arbitration procedure apparently
4 conflicted with the arbitration provisions in the parties'
5 contract. Id. at 1210-11. While Quixtar is correct that the
6 outcome of Wolsey was ordering the parties to submit their
7 disputes to non-binding arbitration, the only legal issue that the
8 court actually decided was whether the choice-of-law provision
9 incorporated California arbitration rules. See id. at 1209-13.
10 That question of contract interpretation has no bearing on the
11 present matter. The parties here do not dispute what rules govern
12 the arbitration; they dispute whether those rules are valid.

13 In support of their claim of substantive unconscionability,
14 Plaintiffs direct the Court's attention to Nyulassy v. Lockheed
15 Martin Corp., 120 Cal. App. 4th 1267 (Ct. App. 2004). Nyulassy's
16 employment agreement required him to submit his employment claims
17 to arbitration, even though his employer was not required to do
18 so. Id. at 1282. The agreement also required him to submit to
19 discussions with his supervisors to attempt informal resolution
20 before, and as a condition precedent to, arbitration. Id. at
21 1282-83. And the agreement gave him only 180 days to bring his
22 claims against his employer, even where the governing statutes of
23 limitations were as long as four years. Id. The court held that,
24 taken together, these three factors rendered the arbitration
25 agreement substantively unconscionable. Id. at 1283. The court
26 noted that requiring the employee to submit to employer-
27 controlled, non-binding dispute resolution before arbitration

1 would give the employer a "free peek" at the employee's case,
2 giving the employer an unfair advantage if the dispute proceeded
3 to arbitration. Id. at 1282-83.

4 Two district courts have considered the Nyulassy ruling in
5 some depth, and provide meaningful guidance on the issue. In
6 Dunham v. Environmental Chemical Corp., No. 06-03389, 2006 U.S.
7 Dist. LEXIS 61068, at *16-18 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 16, 2006), Judge
8 White found that an arbitration agreement requiring an employee to
9 submit all her claims against her employer to arbitration, but
10 allowing the employer to pursue any legal remedy available, was
11 unconscionable. The court then considered a provision requiring
12 the employee to exhaust pre-arbitration remedies in the company's
13 internal grievance procedure. Id. at *21. Following Nyulassy,
14 the court found that, in conjunction with the non-mutual
15 arbitration provision, the pre-arbitration requirements were
16 substantively unconscionable. Id. at *22-23. Plaintiffs urge the
17 Court to follow Dunham.

18 By contrast, the court in Allen considered Nyulassy but found
19 the arbitration provision at issue to be valid and enforceable.⁹
20 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS at *32. Contrary to Quixtar's reading of
21 that case, the Allen court did not reject Nyulassy's holding

22
23 ⁹Quixtar describes the holding in Allen as "rejecting
24 unconscionability challenge to mandatory pre-arbitration grievance
25 procedures." Quixtar Mot. at 12. This is inaccurate. The claim
26 in Allen was that the arbitration agreement was unenforceable
27 because it violated public policy, not because it was
unconscionable. See Allen, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS at *15, 24, 28.
Despite this, the Court considers Allen here because of its
discussion of Nyulassy and because the contract provisions in
question are similar even though the theory for challenging them is
different.

1 "precisely because the mediation in Allen, as here, was non-
2 binding." Quixtar Reply at 6. Rather, the court found that two
3 of the three conditions supporting a conclusion of
4 unconscionability in Nyulassy – the lack of mutuality and the
5 shortened time limits – were not present. Allen, 2004 U.S. Dist.
6 LEXIS at *31 ("The parties' agreement in the present case does not
7 contain two out of the three characteristics of the agreement in
8 Nyulassy that led the California court to find it 'one-sided.'").
9 That the pre-arbitration process was non-binding was not, in
10 itself, sufficient to support a finding of unconscionability.

11 The Informal and Formal Conciliation provisions of the RoC
12 are more like those in Nyulassy and Dunham than those in Allen.
13 First, the RoC imposes no requirement on Quixtar to engage in
14 Informal or Formal Conciliation. Quixtar claims that the
15 obligations are bilateral, citing the portion of RoC 11.5 which
16 says, "In the event the parties are unable to resolve their
17 disputes within 90 days or after the above outlined Conciliation
18 Process is complete, the parties are required to submit any
19 remaining claims . . . to binding arbitration in accordance with
20 the Arbitration Rules as stated below." That "the parties" must
21 continue on to arbitration if conciliation fails does not make the
22 requirement mutual, as there is no provision requiring Quixtar
23 itself to enter either Informal or Formal Conciliation in the
24 first place. In fact, RoC 11.3.4 allows the parties to skip
25 Formal Conciliation and move directly to arbitration if both sides
26 are IBOs and Quixtar is not a party. Thus, if Quixtar initiates
27 the dispute, it is not required to engage in Informal or Formal

1 Conciliation, and if an IBO initiates a dispute against Quixtar,
2 that party must go through additional steps it would not have to
3 take, under the same rules, if the dispute were with another IBO.
4 The mutuality Quixtar claims is illusory.

5 Second, the RoC shortens the statute of limitations to two
6 years for all claims. See VanderVen Decl. Ex. 2 at D-42, RoC
7 11.5. The Court addresses the propriety of a contractually-
8 reduced limitations period for arbitration separately below.
9 However, as in Nyulassy, the shortened limitations period renders
10 the requirement to participate in Informal and Formal Conciliation
11 substantively unconscionable. The RoC cuts the window for seeking
12 relief at both ends. At the front end, the IBO cannot initiate an
13 arbitration against Quixtar until at least 90 days after the claim
14 arises, because it must go through Conciliation first. At the
15 back end, the IBO only has two years to initiate the arbitration
16 (or less if the applicable statute of limitations is shorter).

17 These two factors alone are enough for the Court to
18 distinguish Allen and to follow Nyulassy in finding the pre-
19 arbitration provisions of the Quixtar process unconscionable.
20 However, even if an IBO goes through both stages of Conciliation
21 and prevails, Quixtar has the unilateral right to reverse or
22 modify the Hearing Panel's decision, and there are no standards
23 governing whether Quixtar does so. Under RoC 11.3.3, "After
24 consideration of the entire file and completion of any independent
25 investigation, the Corporation will issue a final decision and may
26 accept, reverse, or modify either the Hearing Panel's
27 recommendation or the IBOA International Board's recommendation as
28

1 appropriate." Id. at D-41, RoC 11.3.3. Unlike the Hearing Panel
2 itself, Quixtar is not even nominally required to make a decision
3 in line with the RoC. The parties debate extensively whether the
4 Hearing Panel or the IBOAI Board is a true "neutral" for the
5 purposes of Conciliation. This debate seems irrelevant, however,
6 given that neither the Hearing Panel nor the IBOAI Board has any
7 actual authority. Quixtar is ultimately the only one to make a
8 decision in the process. That Quixtar's final decision on the
9 matter is non-binding does not salvage the rest of the process.

10 Quixtar makes the incongruous argument that, because it only
11 has the final decision in cases where it is a party, and not in
12 disputes between IBOs, this somehow makes the process better.
13 Quixtar Reply at 9-10 ("The feature calling for Quixtar's 'final
14 decision' applies only to conciliations in which Quixtar is itself
15 a party, not where the conciliation involves a dispute among
16 IBOs"). It does not. To the contrary, it means that Quixtar has
17 an advantage in the process that no other party has. If
18 Plaintiffs were on the receiving end of a complaint and were
19 unsuccessful at the Formal Conciliation stage, they would not be
20 able to reverse the Hearing Panel, and they would not be able to
21 appeal to Quixtar. Only Quixtar has that right.

22 Finally, the Court agrees with Plaintiffs that because the
23 entire Conciliation process is governed by, and intended to
24 perpetuate, the RoC, it cannot serve as a fair and meaningful
25 system for challenging the RoC. Quixtar claims that "there is no
26 limitation on disputes that may be taken into conciliation"
27 because the scope of the ADR process is broad. Quixtar Reply at
28

1 8. That the process may ostensibly be used to address "any issues
2 related to" an IBO's Quixtar business does not make it a useful or
3 fair vehicle for doing so. The defect is not that the RoC has a
4 limited scope. Rather, it is that the RoC is self-perpetuating
5 and therefore inherently biased against the IBO challenging it.
6 The only standard guiding the Hearing Panel during Conciliation is
7 compliance with the RoC. See VanderVen Decl. Ex. 2 at D-40 to D-
8 42, RoC 11.3.1, 11.4. As the RoC itself cannot be in violation of
9 the RoC, an IBO that wishes to challenge the process has no
10 meaningful chance to succeed. Quixtar asserts that the "remedies
11 available are broad enough to accommodate rules challenges, and
12 there is nothing in the conciliation process to prevent rules
13 changes." Quixtar Reply at 8. This is implausible, as the
14 Hearing Panel is not authorized to fashion remedies which modify
15 the RoC. See id. at D-42, RoC 11.4 ("Any resolutions, remedies,
16 and sanctions recommended by the Hearing Panel or the IBOA
17 International Board should promote and further the goal of
18 compliance and must be consistent with the IBO Plan and Rules of
19 Conduct."). At most, the Hearing Panel could recommend a change
20 to the RoC, but as explained above, Quixtar has no obligation to
21 accept that recommendation.

22 The Court finds, without reaching every possible defect
23 identified by Plaintiffs, that the RoC requirement that an IBO
24 engage in Informal and Formal Conciliation prior to arbitration is
25 substantively unconscionable, and exceedingly so. The ADR deck
26 could not possibly be stacked more in Quixtar's favor than it is
27 here. Having already concluded that the agreement is procedurally
28

1 unconscionable because the Plaintiffs did not have a chance to
2 negotiate its terms, the Court holds that the pre-arbitration
3 provisions of the agreement are unconscionable, and declines to
4 enforce them.

5 2. Arbitration

6 The same standards set forth above determine the substantive
7 unconscionability of the Quixtar arbitration agreement.¹⁰ See
8 supra Section V.D. The Court has concluded that the non-binding
9 Conciliation provisions are not enforceable. Quixtar therefore
10 moves to stay this action and compel arbitration under the Quixtar
11 Arbitration Rules. Quixtar Mot. at 13-22; Quixtar Reply at 11-15.
12 Plaintiffs contend that the Quixtar Arbitration Rules set forth in
13 RoC 11 are substantively unconscionable, even independent of the
14 Conciliation provisions. The Court agrees with Plaintiffs.

15 a) Non-Mutual Obligation to Arbitrate

16 To begin, some of the defects in the Conciliation process are
17 equally applicable to the arbitration process, and therefore weigh
18 in Plaintiffs' favor. As noted above, the arbitration provision
19 is non-mutual. Nothing in RoC 11.5 requires Quixtar to enter the
20 ADR process in the first place:

21 IBOs shall give notice in writing of any claim
22 or dispute arising out of or relating to their
23 IB, or the IBO Plan or Rules of Conduct, to
24 the other party or parties, specifying the
basis for any claim and the amount claimed or
relief sought. They must then try in good
faith to resolve the dispute using the Dispute

25 ¹⁰Because the arbitration procedures are included in the same
26 agreement as the conciliation procedures, the procedural
27 unconscionability analysis above is equally applicable here. See
supra Section V.C.

Resolution procedures contained herein.

VanderVen Decl. Ex. 2 at D-42, RoC 11.5. Quixtar may be forced into ADR if an IBO initiates the dispute, but if Quixtar initiates, it is free to do so in court. Requiring one party to arbitrate its claims, but not the other, is the paradigm of one-sidedness, and a prime example of substantive unconscionability. See Little, 29 Cal. 4th at 1072 (citing Armendariz, 24 Cal. 4th at 119).¹¹

b) Reduced Statute of Limitations

The lack of mutuality regarding mandatory arbitration carries over into the statute of limitations dispute. The relevant portion of RoC 11.5 states: "Demand for arbitration shall be made within two years after the issue has arisen, but in no event after the date when the initiation of legal proceedings would have been barred by the applicable statute of limitations." VanderVen Decl. Ex. 2 at D-42, RoC 11.5. If Quixtar has a complaint against an IBO, it may initiate legal proceedings after the two year limitation expires because it is not required to arbitrate. This imbalance is significant. In a dispute between Quixtar and an IBO arising out of the same set of facts, where each party alleges the same unlawful conduct – for example, breach of a written contract

¹¹Under California law, the party with superior bargaining power may preserve a judicial remedy for itself without automatically rendering an arbitration provision unconscionable, so long as the party's legitimate business realities create a need for that remedy, and so long as those business issues are set forth in the contract or established on the record before the court. See, e.g., Davis, 485 F.3d at 1080. Quixtar has not argued that the imbalance discussed here is justified by the realities of its business.

1 – Quixtar could initiate litigation after two years, while the
2 IBO's claim would be barred for failure to demand arbitration
3 within the same two year period. In defense of the shortened
4 statute of limitations, Quixtar cites a parcel of Michigan cases
5 where courts approved a contractually-shortened statute of
6 limitations. See Quixtar Mot. at 20. Those cases do not govern.
7 But the proposition is not that parties may never shorten the
8 statute of limitations. Such an agreement may be enforceable
9 under California law as well, if it applies to both parties and
10 the shortened time is still reasonable. See, e.g., Soltani v. W.
11 & S. Life Ins. Co., 258 F.3d 1038, 1043-44 (9th Cir. 2001). Where
12 the reduction is unilateral, as here, it is substantively
13 unconscionable. See, e.g., Nyulassy, 120 Cal. App. 4th at 1283.

c) Treatment of Class Actions

15 The next defect Plaintiffs identify in the Quixtar
16 arbitration scheme is a barrier to bringing class action suits.
17 Quixtar Opp'n at 17-18. There is nothing in the RoC, however,
18 which explicitly precludes a class action. Plaintiffs acknowledge
19 that the RoC is silent on the issue, but claim that the silence
20 creates an ambiguity, and that such ambiguity must be construed
21 against Quixtar as the drafter of the provision. The Court
22 disagrees. While it may be the case that the Court must interpret
23 an ambiguous provision in favor of the non-drafting party, silence
24 does not necessarily create ambiguity, and the authorities
25 Plaintiffs cite do not compel the Court to find an ambiguity where
26 none exists. See Victoria v. Super. Ct., 40 Cal. 3d 734, 738-39
27 (1985); Waqqaman v. Northwestern Sec. Ins. Co., 16 Cal. App. 3d

1 571, 577 (Ct. App. 1971). Plaintiffs claim that the problems they
2 identified in the Informal and Formal Conciliation processes are
3 barriers to class actions, and that without an explicit provision
4 allowing class action, the arbitration agreement is
5 unconscionable. The Court has already determined that the pre-
6 arbitration provisions are unenforceable, but there is no basis
7 for carrying that conclusion further here.

8 d) Confidentiality Rules

9 Plaintiffs also point to the confidentiality provision in the
10 RoC as problematic. The confidentiality rule appears at least
11 three times in the RoC. First, the introductory paragraph of RoC
12 11 states:

13 IBOs who are involved in the dispute
14 resolution process in any manner will not
15 disclose to any other person not directly
16 involved in the dispute resolution process (a)
17 the substance of, or basis for, the claim; (b)
18 the content of any testimony or other
information obtained through the dispute
resolution process; or (c) the resolution
(whether voluntary or not) of any matter that
is subject to the dispute resolution process.

19 VanderVen Decl. Ex. 2 at D-39, RoC 11. It next appears in the
20 third paragraph of RoC 11.5:

21 If IBOs become involved in a claim or dispute
22 under the Dispute Resolution process of the
23 Arbitration Rules, they will not disclose to
24 any other person not directly involved in the
25 conciliation or arbitration process (a) the
substance of, or basis for, the claim (b) the
content of any testimony or other evidence
presented at an arbitration hearing or
obtained through discovery; or (c) the terms
of [sic] amount of any arbitration award.

26
27 Id. at D-42, RoC 11.5. A nearly identical provision appears in

1 RoC 11.5.31:

2 Once a Demand or submission has been sent, the
3 arbitration process shall remain confidential.
4 No party to the claim shall disclose to any
5 other person not directly involved in the
6 arbitration process (a) the substance of, or
7 basis for, the claim; (b) the content of any
8 testimony or other evidence presented at an
9 arbitration hearing or obtained through
discovery in the arbitration; or (c) the terms
or amount of any arbitration award. The
Arbitrator shall maintain the confidentiality
of the hearings and the proceeding and shall
have the authority to make appropriate rulings
to safeguard confidentiality, unless the law
provides to the contrary.

10 Id. at D-48, RoC 11.5.31. The Court includes all three versions
11 because Plaintiffs and Quixtar focus on different provisions in
12 their arguments.

13 Quixtar argues that the confidentiality restriction is
14 bilateral, because RoC 11.5.31 says "No party to the claim shall
15 disclose" any of the details of the dispute. Quixtar Reply at 12.
16 That the provision is bilateral does not automatically make it
17 enforceable, however. See Davis, 485 F.3d at 1078 ("Rather, the
18 logic of Ting [v. AT&T, 319 F.3d 1126 (9th Cir. 2003)] in this
19 regard is that even facially mutual confidentiality provisions can
20 effectively lack mutuality and therefore be unconscionable.").

21 Plaintiffs point to the opening paragraph of RoC 11, which
22 states, "The Dispute Resolution Process begins at the point when
23 the IBO becomes aware of a potential Rule violation or of a claim
24 against another IBO or the Corporation and continues through each
25 step of the process. . . ." Opp'n to Quixtar Mot. at 16. All
26 three versions of the confidentiality rule refer to the "dispute
27 resolution process." Plaintiffs interpret these provisions to

1 require the IBO to maintain confidentiality from the moment an IBO
2 "becomes aware" of a claim. As such, the RoC prevents an IBO from
3 contacting other IBOs to assist in litigating or arbitrating a
4 dispute. It would also "severely handicap if not stifle an
5 [IBO's] ability to investigate and engage in discovery." Davis,
6 485 F.3d at 1078. Further, requiring confidentiality of all
7 decisions denies potential plaintiffs access to precedent, while
8 allowing Quixtar to develop useful strategies for all stages of
9 the process based on its prior disputes.

10 These limitations are nearly identical to others that have
11 been found unconscionable under California law. See id. at 1078-
12 79; Ting, 319 F.3d at 1151-52. Quixtar does not address Ting in
13 its briefs, and Davis was decided by the Ninth Circuit after this
14 motion was submitted. The only authority Quixtar offers in favor
15 of upholding the confidentiality provisions is unpersuasive. In
16 Stewart & Associates International v. Alticor, Inc., No. 05-3440-
17 CV-S-RED, slip op. (W.D. Mo. Nov. 20, 2006) ("Stewart"), the court
18 rejected unconscionability of the confidentiality provisions
19 without any analysis. Beyond its discussion of arbitrator
20 selection, which the Court addresses below, the Stewart court
21 simply concluded, "[A]fter reviewing the arbitration rules
22 identified as allegedly unconscionable, the Court concludes that
23 none of the identified rules is substantively unreasonable." Id.
24 at 9. Quixtar also cites Morrison v. Amway Corp., 49 F. Supp. 2d
25 529 (S.D. Tex. 1998) ("Morrison I"), rev'd, Morrison II, 2008 U.S.
26 App. LEXIS 2693. The substantive unconscionability analysis in
27 Morrison I amounted to a total of three sentences with no mention
28

1 of confidentiality. Neither Stewart nor Morrison I applied
2 California law, and neither is sufficient to overcome Ting and
3 Davis.

4 e) Selection of Arbitrators

5 Plaintiffs argue that even if an IBO manages to overcome all
6 of the foregoing obstacles, the arbitration will still be unfair
7 because the process Quixtar uses to select arbitrators is itself
8 unconscionable. Quixtar claims that Plaintiffs refer to an
9 outdated version of the RoC, and that the current version has been
10 amended to address Plaintiffs' concerns.

11 The previous version of the RoC required the IBO to use a
12 JAMS arbitrator who had participated in a training program
13 conducted by Quixtar and the IBOAI. The training was purportedly
14 designed to give potential arbitrators background on how Quixtar's
15 business operates, as familiarity with the general business would
16 make the arbitration more efficient and more effective. In
17 previous disputes, IBOs challenged this requirement, asserting
18 that the training program provided an overly-positive view of
19 Quixtar and biased the arbitrators in Quixtar's favor. See
20 Stewart, supra; Nitro Distr. Co. v. Alticor, Inc., No. 03-3290,
21 slip op. (W.D. Mo. Sept. 16, 2005), aff'd, 453 F.3d 995 (8th Cir.
22 2006), ("Nitro").

23 The Nitro court described Quixtar's arbitrator training in
24 detail.

25 Amway's "training" covered a two day period
26 and then a third day of "interviews." The
27 training covered subjects including profiles
of the people who started and now run Amway,
the benevolent and independent culture of

Amway, procedures to the [sic] used in arbitration, and a summary of various complaints the arbitrators could anticipate. The arbitrator candidates even participated in some "role playing" as successful Amway distributors. Also included throughout the two days were assurances that Amway was not a pyramid scheme and that the business was legitimate. Defendants claim, however, that the training was not out of the ordinary nor improper as the panel was not specifically told how to resolve possible issues they would see. On the videos, the Defendants state they will not discuss the meaning of the Rules of Conduct that are not absolutely "black and white."

10 Nitro, slip op. at 23. The court found that the training went
11 beyond basic education of arbitrators regarding specialized
12 subject matter to subtle manipulation of the arbitration process.

13 Id. at 24. Ultimately, the court concluded that "allowing such
14 training and influence over the arbitrators as Defendants have in
15 this situation is both unreasonable and unfair," and refused to
16 enforce the arbitration agreement. Id. at 25.

17 Although Quixtar asserts that it is not estopped from re-
18 arguing the fairness of the arbitrator selection process struck
19 down by the Nitro court, it does not actually make the argument in
20 either of its briefs. Rather, it relies on the updated RoC, which
21 gives IBOs an alternate means of selecting an arbitrator.

22 Under the current RoC, Quixtar still trains possible
23 arbitrators with the same process, and still maintains a "Roster
24 of Neutrals" who have participated in the training. See VanderVen
25 Decl. Ex. 2 at D-45 to D-46, RoC 11.5.14, 11.5.17. After
26 receiving the arbitration demand, the arbitration administrator
27 sends the parties a list of at least five people from the Roster

1 of Neutrals who are available to conduct the arbitration. Id. at
2 D-46, RoC 11.5.17.A. With this list of neutrals, the
3 administrator includes an explanation encouraging the use of the
4 trained neutrals, but providing instructions on how to object.
5 Id. The parties have 14 calendar days from the date the
6 administrator sends the list of neutrals to object to the use of
7 trained neutrals, and opt instead for a JAMS arbitrator who has
8 not participated in the training. Id., RoC 11.5.17.B. The
9 parties then choose from an alternate list of arbitrators, with
10 each party having the opportunity to strike two names from the
11 list. Id., RoC 11.5.17.C. Quixtar asserts that there is a third
12 option after trained and untrained JAMS arbitrators. However,
13 this provision only applies if JAMS is unwilling or unable to
14 conduct the arbitration, see id. at D-43, RoC 11.5.5, and is not
15 actually a route available to an IBO dissatisfied with the JAMS
16 options. If the parties opt to use a Quixtar-trained arbitrator,
17 they are billed at the arbitrator's published hourly rate, but the
18 fee cannot exceed \$6,000.00 per day. Id. at D-52, RoC 11.5.56.A.
19 If the parties instead select to use an arbitrator from the
20 alternative list of untrained neutrals, they are billed at the
21 arbitrator's published hourly rate with no daily cap.

22 This multi-option selection system was apparently adopted in
23 response to the Nitro ruling, and is intended to address the bias
24 that court found. The same court considered the updated selection
25 process in Stewart. Stewart, slip op. at 6. The court in Stewart
26 found that the process remained unfair because, as noted above,
27 there was no real alternative to JAMS neutrals, and because, since
28

1 Quixtar had built the relationship with JAMS, even the untrained
2 JAMS neutrals would favor Quixtar. Id. at 8-9.

3 The Court does not agree with the Stewart conclusion
4 regarding JAMS neutrals. That JAMS is a for-profit operation is
5 not, in itself, sufficient basis for concluding that it is
6 inherently biased in favor of a party that has sent it significant
7 business. Though for-profit, JAMS is in the business of being
8 neutral, and a persistent bias in favor of certain parties would
9 undermine its overall success. Plaintiffs have offered no
10 evidence supporting a different conclusion.

11 However, the neutrality of the untrained JAMS arbitrators is
12 not sufficient to overcome other imbalances in the amended
13 selection process. First, the Court finds that the initial
14 arbitrator selection notice unfairly benefits Quixtar. As noted
15 above, Quixtar does not deny that the use of trained arbitrators
16 is to its advantage. That the arbitrator selection notice
17 encourages the use of a decidedly unfair process, without
18 describing any possible disadvantages of using trained neutrals,
19 is improper. Even assuming an IBO recognizes this disadvantage,
20 it must then risk incurring higher fees to opt out and use
21 untrained neutrals. Quixtar should not encourage the use of an
22 unfair process and IBOs should not have to pay extra to avoid that
23 unfairness. The Court therefore finds the process for selecting
24 arbitrators embodied in the current RoC unconscionable.

25 f) Cost of Arbitration

26 Finally, Plaintiffs challenge the fee provisions of the
27 Quixtar ADR scheme as unconscionable in part because arbitration
28

1 is more costly than litigation, and in part because the RoC shifts
2 the fees to the losing party. In response, Quixtar argues that
3 Plaintiffs cannot prove that they would incur higher costs by
4 arbitrating, and that speculative costs are not a sufficient basis
5 for refusing to enforce the arbitration agreement. Quixtar does
6 not appear to address the fee-shifting issue at all in its Motion
7 or Reply.

8 Quixtar asserts that "Rule 11.5.56 does not specify which
9 party will pay the arbitrator's fees or how such fees might be
10 shared by the parties in a multi-party case like the present one."
11 Quixtar Mot. at 19. Though technically accurate, this is
12 disingenuous. Although RoC 11.5.56 does not specify which party
13 pays the fees, RoC 11.5.48 does.

14 The Arbitrator may grant any remedy or relief
15 that the Arbitrator deems just and equitable
16 and that would have been available to the
17 parties had the matter been heard in court.
18 The Arbitrator shall, in the award, assess
19 arbitration fees, costs, expenses, reasonable
attorneys' fees, and compensation as provided
in the applicable Fees/Costs Schedule, in
favor of the prevailing party and, in the
event any fees or costs are due the
Administrator, in favor of the Administrator.

20 The Arbitrator shall award to a prevailing
21 party reimbursement for that party's
reasonable attorney's fees in whole or in
part.

22
23 VanderVen Decl. Ex. 2 at D-50, RoC 11.5.48. An IBO who initiates
24 an arbitration against Quixtar under the RoC and does not prevail
25 will potentially be responsible not only for the full cost of the
26 arbitration itself, but also for Quixtar's reasonable attorney's
27 fees. By contrast, litigation in federal court provides for a

1 successful RICO plaintiff to recover attorney's fees, but does not
2 expose such a plaintiff to the risk of having to pay the
3 defendant's fees if the suit is unsuccessful. See 18 U.S.C. §
4 1964(c). Practically speaking, a "loser pays" provision makes
5 arbitration a much greater financial risk than litigation. The
6 RoC thus requires an IBO to incur greater risk in the prosecution
7 of statutorily-protected rights. This undoubtedly discourages
8 IBOs from demanding arbitration, and therefore favors Quixtar
9 substantially. See Blenn Decl. ¶¶ 3-11; Pokorny Decl. ¶¶ 3-11.
10 Courts have held such provisions unenforceable in California and
11 other states. See e.g., *Veliz v. Cintas Corp.*, No. 03-1180, 2004
12 WL 2452851, at *22, 23, 37, (N.D. Cal. April 5, 2004)
13 (invalidating "loser pays" provision as to plaintiffs from
14 California, Colorado, and New Jersey). The Court finds that the
15 "loser pays" provision in RoC 11.5.48 unfairly favors Quixtar and
16 is therefore unconscionable.

17 With regard to the total cost of arbitration relative to
18 litigation, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have not provided
19 adequate evidentiary support for their contention.

20 g) Severability

21 Quixtar urges the Court to simply sever any provisions in the
22 RoC that the Court finds unconscionable, but to enforce the
23 remainder, as the court in Stewart did. See Stewart, slip op. at
24 9-10. Under California law, the Court has the discretion to sever
25 or to reject the entire agreement. Ingle v. Circuit City Stores,
26 Inc., 328 F.3d 1165, 1180 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing Circuit City
27 Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 279 F.3d 889, 895 (9th Cir. 2002); Cal.

1 Civ. Code. § 1670.5(a)).

2 The Stewart court was able to sever easily because it found
3 only one provision unconscionable under the applicable law.
4 See Stewart, slip op. at 9-10. The same is not true here.
5 Severing the offending provisions would remove the Informal and
6 Formal Conciliation requirements, the non-mutual arbitration
7 requirement, the reduced statute of limitations, the
8 confidentiality requirements, the arbitrator selection process,
9 and the fee shifting provisions. Even if the Court chose to
10 "enforce" the remainder, it would have virtually no effect. Where
11 an arbitration agreement is so permeated with unconscionable
12 provisions, the Court may refuse to enforce the agreement as a
13 whole, rather than severing specific provisions. See Armendariz,
14 24 Cal. 4th at 124-25; Ingle, 328 F.3d at 1180.

15 The Quixtar arbitration agreement is simply too tainted to be
16 saved through minor adjustments. Therefore, though mindful of the
17 strong state and federal policies favoring arbitration, the Court
18 holds that the entire Quixtar ADR scheme is unconscionable and
19 unenforceable.

20

21 **VI. THE IBO DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS**

22 The foregoing analysis focuses largely on how the arbitration
23 provision unfairly favors Quixtar in a dispute initiated by an
24 IBO. Despite this, the Court finds large portions of it
25 applicable to the Britt Defendants and the Puryear Defendants as
26 well, and therefore DENIES their motions.

27

The IBO Defendants assert that because they are IBOs who

28

1 executed the Registration (or third party beneficiaries of the
2 agreement contained in the Registration), their disputes with
3 Plaintiffs are governed by the Quixtar ADR process. The Court has
4 already concluded that Plaintiffs had no meaningful opportunity to
5 negotiate any of these provisions with Quixtar, and the IBO
6 Defendants do not suggest that, though submitting to the terms
7 themselves, they negotiated the terms directly with Plaintiffs.
8 Nor do the IBO Defendants suggest that Plaintiffs had any chance
9 to negotiate the terms of the BSMAA or the DM Terms & Conditions.
10 As such, the Court's prior rulings regarding procedural
11 unconscionability are equally applicable here.

12 Although some of the provisions addressed above are non-
13 mutual between Quixtar and Plaintiffs, the same provisions may be
14 mutual and bilateral between Plaintiffs and the IBO Defendants.
15 The Court still finds the majority unconscionable. The
16 confidentiality provisions still hamper Plaintiffs to the same
17 degree against the IBO Defendants as they do against Quixtar. The
18 fee-shifting provisions are also equally offensive in Plaintiffs'
19 dispute against the IBO Defendants. Finally, the arbitrator
20 selection process is as unfair to Plaintiffs in this context as it
21 was above, particularly where Plaintiffs allege that the IBO
22 Defendants acted in concert with Quixtar in an illegal enterprise.
23 Together, these three defects in the ADR scheme render it
24 substantively unconscionable, and therefore unenforceable.

25
26 **VII. CLAIMS FOR INJUNCTIVE RELIEF**

27 Because the Court rejects the entire Quixtar ADR scheme

1 embodied in the RoC, it need not separately address the claims for
2 injunctive relief Busiere added in the First Amended Complaint.
3

4 **VIII. CONCLUSION**

5 For the foregoing reasons, the Court finds that the
6 arbitration agreement contained in the Registration, the BSMAA,
7 and the DM Terms and Conditions, and incorporating the RoC, is
8 procedurally and substantively unconscionable, and therefore
9 unenforceable. The Court therefore ORDERS as follows:

- 10 1. Quixtar's Motion to Dismiss or Stay and Compel
11 Compliance With Dispute Resolution Agreement is DENIED.
- 12 2. The Britt Defendants' Motion to Dismiss and Compel
13 Compliance With Dispute Resolution Agreement is DENIED.
- 14 3. The Puryear Defendants' Motion in Support of Joinder in
15 Quixtar's and Britt's Motion to Dismiss or Stay
16 Litigation and Compel Compliance With Dispute Resolution
17 Agreement is DENIED.
- 18 4. Plaintiffs' Motion to Strike Quixtar's Reply Re:
19 Statement of Recent Decision is VACATED AS MOOT.

20 IT IS SO ORDERED.
21

22 Dated: March 31, 2008.
23

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30 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE